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Criminal Procedure: Admissibility of Evidence
Obtained in Unannounced Nighttime Search Made
Pursuant to Invalid Warrant
Pursuant to a search warrant authorizing an unannounced entry'
and a nighttime search, police officers entered Robert Lien's apartment without warning and conducted a successful search for marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The evidence obtained during the
search was suppressed by pretrial order on the ground that the police
affidavit presented to the issuing magistrate did not contain sufficient facts to justify inclusion of unannounced entry or nighttime
search clauses in the warrant. 2 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme
Court agreed that the factual showing in the affidavit was insufficient, 3 but nevertheless found the trial court's exclusion of the evidence to be in error, holding that facts ascertained at the time of the
1. An unannounced entry is commonly referred to as a "no-knock entry."See,
e.g., State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 1978). The no-knock entry in Lien
occurred in the following fashion:
[T]he [five] officers observed a car drive up and a person who fit defendant's description go into the residence.
The officers then approached the building. There was a window by the
door, but the curtains were down and the officers could not see into the
apartment. The evidence indicates that the door was slightly open. Pushing
the door completely open, the officers rushed into the apartment with their
firearms drawn. Once in, the officers announced that they were police officers
and told everyone to get up against the walls. The officers proceeded to
handcuff everyone in the apartment and commenced their search.
Id. at 836.
2. Id. at 835. Suppression was based on Mm. STAT. § 626.21(7) (1978), which
allows the defendant to make a motion to suppress evidence where "the warrant was
improvidently issued." See Brief for Appellant at 6-7, 10. The appeal did not concern
the legality of the search warrant per se; rather, the issue was the legality of the
unannounced entry and nighttime search authorizations in an otherwise uncontested
warrant. See 265 N.W.2d at 835.
3. An officer of the Rochester Police Department applied for the search warrant,
submitting an affidavit in which he asserted that there was probable cause for the
search because an informant had reported seeing a large amount of marijuana in the
defendant's apartment. The affidavit contained no specific reasons why an unannounced entry was necessary. Rather than supplying a justification, the officer altered
the warrant request form by deleting the printed word "because" which preceded the
space in which justifications could be provided. A night search was needed, according
to the affidavit, because it was not known when the defendant would be home. Id. at
835-36. The Lien court concluded, as did the district court, that these affidavits, by
themselves, did not justify either an unannounced entry or a night search. Compare
id. at 839-40 with State v. Daniels, 294 Minn. 323, 324, 200 N.W.2d 403, 404-05 (1972);
see Affidavit and Petition for Search Warrant, reprintedin State v. Parker, 283 Minn.
127, 137-39, 166 N.W.2d 347, 353-54 (1969).
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search justified an unannounced entry;4 and that, although the nighttime entry was a statutory violation, 5 it was not an unconstitutional8
intrusion. 6 Exclusion 7 of the evidence was therefore not mandated.
State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833 (Minn. 1978).
The United States Supreme Court has generally required prior
magisterial approval of searches and seizures.9 In Johnson v. United
4. The court reasoned that police observation of several people entering and
leaving the apartment, coupled with an assertion by an informant that there was a
large amount of marijuana on the premises, "sufficiently increased the probability that
defendant was selling marijuana from his apartment to justify [the officers'] belief
that a quick unannounced entry was needed to ensure the safety of the officers." Id.
at 839. While imminent destruction of evidence may seem a more likely rationale for
allowing an unannounced entry in Lien, the presence of a large quantity of marijuana
would have rendered quick destruction nearly impossible. Thus, the court was forced
to rely on the potential peril to the officers to justify the unannounced entry. See text
accompanying note 40 infra.
5. MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (1978) provides:
A search warrant may be served only in the daytime unless the court or
justice of the peace determines on the basis of facts stated in the affidavits
that a nighttime search is necessary to prevent the loss, destruction, or
removal of the objects of the search. The search warrant shall state that it
may be served only in the daytime unless a nighttime search is so authorized.
6. See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
7. The exclusionary rule, first established by the United States Supreme Court
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), operates in criminal cases to
suppress evidence that is obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment
rights. It was applied in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), to exclude unconstitutionally garnered evidence from state court proceedings. Minnesota explicitly recognized the rule in State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 262-63, 270, 121 N.W.2d 327, 330, 334,
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 867 (1963). More recently, in State v. Nolting, 254 N.W.2d 340,
345 n.7 (Minn. 1977), quoted in 265 N.W.2d at 840 n.1, the court noted that, until the
exclusionary rule is abrogated or modified by the United States Supreme Court, it
must be given "full force and effect" by both state and federal courts. For a detailed
history of the exclusionary rule, see Geller, Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The
Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 625-40; Comment,
Impending "FrontalAssault" on the Citadel: The Supreme Court's Readiness to Modify the Strict Exclusionary Rule, 12 TULSA L.J. 337, 341-48 (1976). For a summary of
criticism that has been directed at the rule, and suggested alternatives, see Hyman,
In Pursuit of a More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10
PAC. L.J. 33, 37-62 (1979).
8. 265 N.W.2d at 841.
9. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971); Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 20 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964); Chapman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 610, 613-15 (1961); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261
(1960); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-99 (1958); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914). See generallyE. FISHER, SEARCH
AD
SEZURE §§ 66-67, at 132-35 (1970); id. at 38-39 (Supp. 1972). Even in a parole
situation, where a person is already under constructive police supervision, prior judicial authority is necessary to execute an uncontested search and seizure. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1978).
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5 the Court reasoned,
States,"

The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of
,the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by
neutral and detached magistrates instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."

The rule that prior judicial approval is necessary to validate search
and seizure procedures does not apply, however, when facts learned
at the scene provide justification for police action. 12 Implementing
this exception presents an obvious problem: Courts must allow for
the policy
flexible law enforcement procedures without undermining
13
officer.
judicial
neutral
a
by
approval
prior
favoring
10. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
11. Id. at 13-14. See also State v. Burch, 284 Minn. 300, 305, 170 N.W.2d 543,
548 (1969).
12. Prior judicial authority is not required in cases of "grave emergency,"
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948), or in "exceptional circumstances." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948); see, e.g., South Dakota v.
Operman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976) (vehicle searches); United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (warrantless entry and search incident to hot pursuit); United
States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974) (voluntary consent to search by defendant or his representative); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (search
incident to lawful arrest); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-75
(1973) (customs searches at international borders); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 465-72 (1971) (seized objects in plain view of police); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20 (1968) (search executed in "stop and frisk" situation). Courts commonly recognize such justification even though no prior magisterial approval is obtained. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fontecha, 576 F.2d 601, 605 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Simmons, 444 F. Supp. 500, 506 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Parsley v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.3d 934,
938, 513 P.2d 611, 613-14, 109 Cal. Rptr. 563, 565-66 (1973); People v. Lujan, 174 Colo.
554, 558-59, 484 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (1971); Banks v. State, 575 P.2d 592, 597 (Nev.
1978). See also Heaton v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 137, 139, 207 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1974).
Undue delay in the execution of a warrantless search can, however, void a search
otherwise falling within a valid exception. See, e.g., G.M. Leasing v. United States,
429 U.S. 338, 358-59 (1977); id. at 361 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
13. See State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 134, 166 N.W.2d 347, 352 (1969). Even
though evidence obtained in an unlawful search will be excluded, the defendant nonetheless may have suffered a substantial dignitary invasion. Thus, every precaution
must be taken to ensure that a warrantless search is executed on sufficient factual
bases, and that police do not exceed the scope of their authority. Williamson, The
Supreme Court, Warrantless Searches, and Exigent Circumstances, 31 OKLA. L. RaV.
110, 114-15 (1978); see text accompanying note 62 infra. Often, however, the magistrate
acts merely as a "rubber stamp." See LaFave, WarrantlessSearches and the Supreme
Court: Further Ventures into the "Quagmire," 8 CRnm. L. BuLL. 9, 27 (1972); Miller &
Tiffany, ProsecutorDominance of the WarrantDecision:A Study of CurrentPractices,
1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1, 5 & n.8, 6.
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Another generally accepted rule requires police to announce their
authority and purpose before entering premises to execute a search
warrant." Unannounced entries are allowed, however, when justified
by exigent circumstances. At least three categories of such circumstances are generally recognized: 5 (1) when an announcement would
be a useless gesture because the occupants are already aware of the
presence and purpose of the officers;'" (2) when the occupants' activities justify the executing officers' belief that escape of suspects or
destruction of evidence is being attempted;' 7 and (3) when the officers
reasonably believe that persons within the premises, or the officers
themselves, are in imminent danger of bodily harm.'"
Some jurisdictions hold that exigent circumstances exist in all
drug cases, since drugs are easily destroyed and drug dealers and
users are normally alert to police presence. 9 But most courts reject
such a blanket exception and look instead to the particular circumstances of each case to determine whether an unannounced entry is
justified."
14. This rule, often referred to as the "knock and announce" rule, first appeared
in Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603), and has been restated in both
English and American case law. See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47-50 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 313 (1958); United States v. Ortiz, 311 F. Supp. 880, 883 (D. Colo. 1970), affl'd,
445 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 993 (1971); State v. Linder, 291
Minn. 217, 219, 190 N.W.2d 91, 93 (1971). The rule has also been adopted by statute
in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1531 (West 1970); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 901.16-.17 (West 1972); IowA CODE ANN. § 808.6 (West 1978 Special Pamphlet). A
list of states having such statutes may be found in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S.
301, 308 n.8, and in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 50 n.4 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also 2 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEizuRE: A TXArTIS
ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT 123-25 (1978); Note, No-Knock and the Constitution: The

District of Columbia Court Reform and CriminalProcedureAct of 1970, 55 MmIN. L.
Rxv. 871, 875 n.25 (1971).
15. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,483-84 (1963) (government's failure to claim exigent circumstances justified suppression of evidence).
16. See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958); United States ex
rel. Dyton v. Ellingsworth, 306 F. Supp. 231, 235-36 (D. Del. 1969); State v. Clark, 250
N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1977).
17. See, e.g., People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956); State
v. Clark, 250 N.W.2d 199, 204 (Minn. 1977); State v. Linder, 291 Minn. 217, 219, 190
N.W.2d 91, 93 (1971); State v. Johnson, 16 Ohio Misc. 278, 279, 240 N.E.2d 574, 575
(1968); State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 461, 488 P.2d 822, 826 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 & n.8 (1968); People
v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956).
19. See, e.g., People v. Lujan, 174 Colo. 554, 558-59, 484 P.2d 1238, 1240-41
(1971); People v. Hartfield, 94 Ill. App. 2d 421, 430-31, 237 N.E.2d 193, 197-98 (1968);
Henson v. State, 236 Md. 518, 522-24, 204 A.2d 516, 519-20 (1964); State v. Johnson,
102 R.I. 344, 352-54, 230 A.2d 831, 835-37 (1967).
20. See, e.g., Reynolds v. State, 46 Ala. App. 77, 79-80, 238 So. 2d 557, 559-60,
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In Minnesota, police are generally required to obtain prior judicial approval for searches and seizures, 21 and police officers must
announce their authority and purpose prior to entry.22 Although the
Minnesota Supreme Court has acknowledged the three generally recognized "exigent circumstance" exceptions to the rule proscribing
unannounced entries,n the court has indicated that the concept of
exigent circumstances has somewhat fluid boundaries.24 In the context of drug cases, the court has followed the majority of jurisdictions
and has explicitly refused to create a per se exception to the proscription of unannounced entries.2
A third restriction of police search and seizure activity is the
general rule that, absent special circumstances, police must limit
searches to daylight hours. 2 It has been established that
cert. denied, 286 Ala. 740, 238 So. 2d 560 (1970); State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 399400, 454 P.2d 140, 144-45 (1969); People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal. 2d 18, 28-29, 453 P.2d
353, 359-60, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 815-16 (1969); People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 589,
432 P.2d 706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1967); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441,
448, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (1968); State v. Hatcher, 3 Wash. App. 441, 446-49, 475 P.2d
802, 805-07 (1970). See also State v. Gassner, 6 Or. App. 452, 464, 488 P.2d 822, 82728 (1971) ("destruction-of-the-evidence" exception may be successfully invoked only
when the police have probable cause to believe that evidence in danger is of a "small,
readily disposable" quantity).
21. State v. Nolting, 254 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Minn. 1977); State v. LaBarre, 292
Minn. 228, 233-34, 195 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1972); State v. Paulick, 277 Minn. 140, 14849, 151 N.W.2d 591, 597 (1967); State v. Gruneau, 273 Minn. 315, 323, 141 N.W.2d
815, 822 (1966). Minnesota has also recognized some of the established exceptions to
the rule. For example, prior judicial approval is not required when defendant consents
to the search, see, e.g., State v. Kotka, 277 Minn. 331, 339, 152 N.W.2d 445, 450-51
(1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1056 (1968); when the seized items are in danger of
destruction or removal, see, e.g., State v. Bradley, 264 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. 1978);
State v. Molberg, 310 Minn. 376, 384, 246 N.W.2d 463, 469 (1976); or when police seize
contraband items in plain view. See, e.g., id. at 383 n.2, 246 N.W.2d at 468 n.2; State
v. Huffstutler, 269 Minn. 153, 156, 130 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1964).
22. State v. Linder, 291 Minn. 217, 219, 190 N.W.2d 91, 93 (1971). Minnesota
does not have a statute that requires police to announce their purpose and authority
before entering to execute a search. Id. at 218, 190 N.W.2d at 92; State v. Parker, 283
Minn. 127, 129-30, 166 N.W.2d 347, 349 (1969).
23. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 294 Minn. 323, 330, 200 N.W.2d 403, 407 (1972);
State v. Linder, 291 Minn. 217, 219, 190 N.W.2d 91, 93 (1971); State v. Parker, 283
Minn. 125, 134, 166 N.W.2d 347, 352 (1969).
24. See State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 134,166 N.W.2d 347, 352 (1969) (referring
to "[t]he difficulty confronting courts in fashioning a rule which protects the rights
of individuals and at the same time recognizes the realities of law enforcement").
25. 265 N.W.2d at 838; State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 135-36, 166 N.W.2d 347,
352-53 (1969).
26. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); United States ex rel. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896, 897-98 (3rd
Cir. 1968); United States v. Borkowski, 268 F. 408, 411 (S.D. Ohio 1920); E. FisHER,
supra note 9, § 84, at 160-62 (1970); id. at 48 (Supp. 1972).
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"increasingly severe standards of probable cause are necessary to
justify increasingly intrusive searches." Because nighttime searches
represent significant intrusions on privacy, they are typically viewed
with disfavor by the judiciary.2 The preference for daytime searches
2
is also reflected in many state statutes. In jurisdictions in which
night searches are statutorily proscribed, courts have reached disparate conclusions as to whether such statutes mandate the exclusion of
evidence obtained in an improper night search. Some courts automatically exclude the evidence when there is a statutory violation;
the evidence then becomes admissible only upon a showing by the
police that the reasons for the night search justified the increased
intrusion on the defendant's privacy."0 Other courts, notwithstanding
any statutory violation, admit such evidence unless the defendant
was prejudiced by the search and seizure procedure. Although the
former aproach obviously favors defendants, since the burden of establishing the need for a nighttime search lies with the police, evidence is excluded under either approach when clearly prejudicial
search procedures were used. When the harm to the defendant is less
severe, however, the defendant may not be able to show prejudice,
and the two approaches may lead to different results.
In Minnesota, night searches are prohibited by statute except
when "necessary to prevent the loss, destruction, or removal of the
objects of the search." 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court has justified
nighttime searches when there was a sufficient factual showing in the
27. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 464 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 349-50 n.6 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493,
498-99 (1958).
28. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 463 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971); Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958). Discussing the fourth amendment proscription of unreasonable search and seizure, the Court stated that "[s]earches of the dwelling house were
the special object of. . . condemnation of official intrusion," and that "[n]ighttime
search was the evil in its most obnoxious form." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210
(1961).
29. Twenty-three states have such statutes. 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 14, at 116;
see, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-3917 (1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2308 (1974); N.Y.
CRIn. PROC. LAw §§ 690.30, 690.45 (McKinney 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1230
(West Supp. 1978).
30. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 25 Ariz. App. 49, 50, 540 P.2d 1268, 1269 (1975);
People v. Carminati, 236 N.Y.S.2d 921, 922-23 (Suffolk County Ct. 1962); People v.
Malinsky, 36 Misc. 2d 204, 206, 232 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845-46 (1962).
31. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 267 S.C. 138, 143, 226 S.E.2d 553, 555 (1976);
State v. Sachs, 264 S.C. 541, 566 n.11, 216 S.E.2d 501, 514 n.11 (1975). See also United
States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970).
32. MINN. STAT. § 626.14 (1978), quoted at note 5 supra.
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warrant affidavit;" but prior to Lien, the court had not "reach[ed]
the question of whether a search instituted [in violation of statute]
would be valid if there were no prejudice to the defendant."
33. See, e.g., State v. Saver, 295 Minn. 581, 582, 205 N.W.2d 508, 509 (1973);
State v. Van Wert, 294 Minn. 464, 464-65, 199 N.W.2d 514, 515 (1972).
34. State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 231 n.2, 245 N.W.2d 621, 623 n.2 (1976).
Exclusion of evidence can be an extreme remedy, particularly when the officer's
violation was minor. It occasionally allows "[tihe criminal. . . to go free because the
constable has blundered." People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926);
see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 413 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
Boker & Corrigan, Making the Constable Culpable:A Proposalto Improve the Exclusionary Rule, 27 HAsT. L.J. 1291, 1303 (1976). Nevertheless, exclusion remains the only
effective remedy available to defendants subjected to illegal search procedures. See
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636 (1965); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 445,
282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Cm. L. REV. 665, 675 (1970).
Alternate enforcement procedures have been suggested, including: criminal prosecution of officers who conduct illegal searches, see Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S.
484, 490 (1976); Fortier, supra, at 45; Hyman, supra note 7, at 52; Marinelli, Search
and Seizure: Recent Developments and The Slow Strangulationof the Exclusionary
Rule, 4 Omo N.L. REV. 296, 300 (1977); administrative sanctions applied by the police
department against the offending officers, see Batey, DeterringFourth Amendment
Violations Through Police Disciplinary Reform, 14 AM. CmIM. L. Rlv. 245, 248-52
(1976); Hyman, supra note 7, at 51-52, 55-61; Marinelli, supra, at 300; citation of the
officers for contempt of court, see Fortier, supra, at 45-46; Hyman, supra note 7, at
52; creation of a civil cause of action against the offending officers, see Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971);
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1, 32 (1949); Batey, supra,at 268-70; Hyman, supra
note 7, at 52; and legislative action promoting these sanctions. See, e.g., MINN. STAT.
§ 626.22 (1978); ALI MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRMGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.2 (1975);
Batey, supra, at 262-64; Hyman, supra note 7, at 53-55; Marinelli, supra, at 300.
Although each of these suggestions has certain attractive features, all have been
subject to substantial criticism. Prosecution of errant police, according to courts and
commentators, will not likely deter misconduct. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364
F.2d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 1966); Batey, supra, at 248; Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. Rav. 493, 493-96 (1955); Comment,
Hampton v. United States: Last Rites for the "Objective" Theory of Entrapment?, 89 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTs L. REV.223, 256 (1976-77). Internal administrative discipline
is not likely to occur, see Burger, Who Will Watch the Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. Rv.
1, 11 (1964); Oaks, supra, at 725-26, and even if internal sanctions occur, they are not
likely to deter aberrant police conduct absent "participation of all elements of the
police force." See Batey, supra, at 260. See also id. at 248; Foote, supra, at 494-95.
Legislative action also has not been forthcoming, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
500-01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring), and additional doubt exists concerning the
wisdom of replacing one admittedly flawed rule with another having different, perhaps
more serious, failings.
The adverse effects of exclusion are mitigated in part because the defendant can
often be convicted by using other, legally procured, evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Holzer, 389 A.2d 101, 108 (Pa. 1978). Moreover, because exclusion leads to a reversal
of the defendant's conviction, or at least to a greater likelihood of reversal, exclusion
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In deciding the first issue before it-the validity of the unannounced entry-the Lien court looked to past Minnesota case law and
discerned four principles that govern unannounced police searches.,
First, police must obtain advance judicial authorization for unannounced entry if they believe that such an entry will be necessary for
the safe and successful execution of the warrant. 6 Second, prior authorization should be granted only upon a "strong showing that an
announced entry will result in the destruction of evidence or in danger to the officers .

. .

."I

Third, even if advance authorization for

unannounced entry is obtained, police should reevaluate the need for
such entry at the time of the search. 8 Fourth, when police have no
reason to seek advance authorization or when such authorization is
denied, unannounced entry is allowed if information obtained at the
time of the search indicates that unannounced entry is necessary for
the safe or successful execution of the warrant. 9
Applying these principles to the facts in Lien, the court reasoned
that an informant's report of a large amount of marijuana in the
defendant's apartment, without more, was insufficient to justify prior
authorization of unannounced entry. The court concluded, however,
the when the informant's allegation was coupled with the officers'
observation of a number of people entering and leaving the apartment, the probability that defendant was selling marijuana was sufficient to justify a belief that unannounced entry was necessary for the
protection of the officers."
Unfortunately, the court's conclusion in Lien does not appear to
comport with its principles for unannounced police searches. For example, one principle enunciated in Lien is that, even when advance
authorization is obtained, police may conduct an unannounced entry
only if they conclude, after evaluating facts obtained at the scene,
that an announced entry would endanger the safe or successful execution of the warrant. The court implied that such an evaluation achas the virtue of deterring improper conduct by both the police and the magistrate
issuing the warrant. See note 54 infra.
35. 265 N.W.2d at 838-39.
36. Id. at 838.
37. Id. at 838-39. An officer will not be able to make a strong showing simply by
proving that drugs are involved. There must be a showing of necessity to justify an
unannounced entry. For example, an unannounced entry will be allowed when the
evidence is in danger of being destroyed. Id.

38. Id. at 839.
39. Id.
40. Id. The conclusion that the defendant was selling marijuana must be evaluated in light of the fact that he was not present at the time police observed people
entering and leaving his apartment. The defendant was therefore not actively involved
in drug sales from his apartment during the police surveillance. Id. at 836.
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tually occurred in Lien." Since the police were acting pursuant to a
warrant that contained what they undoubtedly believed to be valid
authorization for unannounced entry, however, it is unlikely that
they reevaluated the situation to determine whether an unannounced
entry was necessary for proper execution of the warrant."2 More probably, they acted wholly on the basis of the invalid unannounced entry
clause in the warrant.
An underlying assumption of the Lien court's reasoning is that
drug sellers and users pose special dangers to officers engaged in
searches. 3 The court offered no justification for such an assumption,"
however, nor did it explore the possibility that buyers and sellers of
marijuana are less likely to be dangerous than those who traffic in
drugs such as amphetamines and barbiturates." Moreover, the
41. "We disagree ... with the district court's conclusion that the police did not
acquire any additional information at the threshold before they executed the warrant
...to justify their belief that a quick unannounced entry was needed to ensure the
safety of the officers." Id. at 839.
42. At trial, "no officer [credibly testified] to any facts allowing a threshold reevaluation of the need to knock .

. . ."

Dist. Ct. Mem. as to Facts, at 2, quoted in

Brief for Respondent at 3. Compare the Lien court's justification of search procedure
based on a hypothetical construction of facts with State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 13637, 166 N.W.2d 347, 353 (1969), where the court allowed an unannounced entry, absent
specific warrant authority, on grounds that if the officers had requested a no-knock
warrant, it would have been granted.
43. 265 N.W.2d at 839. The court stated, "The [increased] probability that
defendant was selling marijuana from his apartment [justified] their belief that a
quick unannounced entry was needed to ensure the safety of the officers." Id.;see State
v. Clark, 250 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1977), quoted in 265 N.W.2d at 838.
44. The Lien court stated that a report of a large amount of marijuana on the
premises, coupled with observance of people entering and leaving the apartment,
allowed the police to infer that marijuana sales were occurring. These inferences, in
turn, justified a belief that announcement before entry would imperil the officers.
Other courts have concluded, however, that the presence of large amounts of marijuana
does not imply a danger to police. See People v. Marguez, 273 Cal. App. 2d 341, 34445, 77 Cal. Rptr. 907, 909-10 (1969); People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 589, 432 P.2d
706, 708, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 12 (1967); State v. Brown, 253 N.W.2d 601, 604 (Iowa 1977).
But see United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1307 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 918 (1974); People v. De Santiago, 71 Cal. 2d 18, 28-29, 453 P.2d 353, 360, 76 Cal.
Rptr. 809, 816 (1969). Furthermore, the mere fact that several people passed through
defendant's apartment, without a more definite showing of their actions while there,
would not render the officers' situation perilous. In addition, empirical evidence indicates that neither drug use nor commission of a particular criminal offense are accurate
indicia of violent behavior. In one study, 326 incorrect predictions of violent behavior
were made for each accurate prediction. Monahan & Cummings, Social Policy Implications of the Inability to Predict Violence, 31 J. Soc. IssuES 153, 155 (1975).
45. Marijuana and opiate users are less likely to commit violent crime than are
users of amphetamines or barbiturates. NATIONAL CoMIssION ON MARJUANA AND DRUG
ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AmERiCA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE 159, 162-63, 165 (1973). But see
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court's presumption of danger tends to create a per se drug case
exception to the general proscription of unannounced entries. Such
an exception is inconsistent with the general governing principles set
forth in Lien," and with the court's explicit rejection of a per se drug
case exception. 7
Even assuming that some danger to the officers existed in Lien,
the court failed to consider the comparative risks of announced and
unannounced entries. By rushing into the apartment unannounced,
the officers in Lien may well have invited an impulsive, violent response by the occupants." Since five armed officers were at the scene,
an announcement might have resulted in a quiet surrender."
A broad policy underlying the proscription of unannounced entries is the "reverence of the law for the individual's right of privacy
in his house. ' 50 The failure of the Minnesota Supreme Court to apply
this general policy to the facts of Lien is disturbing. Indeed, the court
ignored its own prior recognition of the need to protect individual
expectations of "privacy and freedom from intrusion . ... "I'
Prior to Lien, the Minnesota Supreme Court had approved
nighttime searches when the search was justified by a sufficient factual showing in an affidavit, but had not reached the question of
whether an invalid night search would result in exclusion of the evidence. 5 The court addressed this issue in Lien, holding that the
The Columbian Connection, TIME, Jan. 29, 1979, at 23; Where the Grass is Greener;
Home-grown Pot in Oregon and Northern California,TME, June 12, 1978, at 22.
46. 265 N.W.2d at 838-39. The contrast between the principles outlined in Lien
and the conclusion that an unannounced entry was justified is underscored by the
minimal level of "threshold" facts deemed sufficient to validate the unannounced
search. See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
47. See note 25 supra.
48. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); United States ex rel.
Dyton v. Ellingsworth, 306 F. Supp. 231, 235 (D. Del. 1969). Percy, The Legacy of NoKnock: Drug Law Enforcement Abuse, 3 ComEMP. DRUG PROB. 3, 11-13 (1974); Note,
Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 154 (1970).
49. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958); United States ex rel. Dyton v. Ellingsworth, 306
F. Supp. 231, 235 (D. Del. 1969). See generally Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 217, 226-28 (1976).
The situation would have been different, of course, if the police had reason to believe
that the defendant was armed or had a propensity for violent behavior.
50. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968) (quoting Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)); see Greven v. Superior Court, 455 P.2d 432, 437-38,
78 Cal. Rptr. 504, 509-10 (1969); State v. Daniels, 294 Minn. 323, 335-36, 200 N.W.2d
403, 410 (1972) (expressing "instinctive revulsion at the forcible breaking into a home
except in clearly exigent circumstances"); E. FIsHFR, supra note 9, § 67, at 133-35
(1970); id. at 39 (Supp. 1972). But see Sonnenreich & Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense,
An Alleged ConstitutionalProblem, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 626, 646-47 (1970) (questioning whether notice of authority and purpose actually protects privacy).
51.

State v. Parker, 283 Minn. 127, 135, 166 N.W.2d 347, 352 (1969).

52. See notes 33-34 supra and accompanying text.
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nighttime search in question was merely a "technical" violation of
the statute that did not require exclusion of evidence obtained during

the search;53 it was not a constitutional violation." The court emphasized four factors: (1) the search was executed early in the evening;
(2) the police knew the defendant had just returned home and was
awake and fully dressed; (3) there was considerable activity in the
defendant's apartment; and (4) the door was partially open. 5 In addition, the court stated that, although the search took place at night,
it did not represent the serious type of intrusion the statute was
primarily designed to prevent. 6
The United States Supreme Court has observed that a night
search of a dwelling represents the "most obnoxious form" of the evils
proscribed by the fourth amendment.-" It is appropriate, therefore, to
expect a careful examination of any night search of a dwelling to
determine whether it was executed in violation of the fourth amendment. But the Lien court failed to undertake such an examination,
and simply reasoned that since the search did not involve rousing
people out of bed and forcing them to stand by in their night clothes,
it did not have a constitutional dimension. 8 In focusing on what the
53. 265 N.W.2d at 841. In the affidavit accompanying the search warrant, the
officer requested a nighttime search because he was not certain when the defendant
would be home. The court found this to be an insufficient justification for a night
search under the night search statute. Id. at 840. The statute requires that searches
be made in the daytime unless the affidavit contains facts showing that a nighttime
search is necessary to prevent the loss, destruction, or removal of the objects of the
search. See note 5 supra.
Prior to Lien, the court held that "minor and technical" defects in the execution
of a warrant did not merit suppression of evidence obtained during a search. State v.
Mollberg, 310 Minn. 376, 385-87, 246 N.W.2d 463, 469-70 (1976). In that case, however,
the violations were obviously technical in nature, involving alleged improper execution
and misfiling of papers after the search was completed. In Lien, by contrast, the night
search violations-occurring prior to and in the execution of the search itself-directly
and immediately impinged on the defendant's expectation of privacy.
54. 265 N.W.2d at 841. The Lien court speculated as to whether the exclusiohary
rule should apply even if the search was deemed to be constitutionally infirm. The
court reasoned that exclusion would not serve to deter future police misconduct, since
the police in Lien "acted in good faith." Id. at 840. Although police cannot be expected
to pass judgment on the sufficiency of warrants in all cases, consistent application of
the exclusionary rule in cases such as Lien, where the affidavit deficiency is obvious,
certainly would prompt police to obtain and submit some compelling factual information to the magistrate when requesting warrants. Hence, contrary to the court's reasoning, the policy of deterring police misconduct would have been well served by application of the exclusionary rule in Lien.
55. Id. at 841.
56. Id.
57. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961); see notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
58. 265 N.W.2d at 841.
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search was not, rather than on the search that actually occurred, the
court failed to consider that four officers rushed unannounced into
the apartment at night with their guns drawn, threatened the defendant, and handcuffed all of the occupants.59 The court's summary
treatment of this nighttime intrusion is inconsistent not only with the
fourth amendment's "condemnation" of night searches,"0 but with
the court's own recognition that a night search "involves a much
greater intrusion upon privacy.

. .

than an ordinary daytime search

of a home.""1 It seems clear that, although it may have been reasonable for the court to conclude that the search was not sufficiently
intrusive to be unconstitutional, the facts of the case warranted a
more extensive discussion of the constitutional question.,2
The Lien decision appears to emphasize the importance of protecting criminal defendants from illegal search and seizure activity.
The final disposition of the case, however, belies any such emphasis.
The court's failure to adhere to the principles it established regarding
unannounced entry raises doubts as to their utility; their vitality is
further undermined by the problematical factual assumptions with
which the court rationalized the unannounced entry. The court's
summary treatment of the night search issue similarly does not reflect the deference supposedly accorded criminal defendants' constitutional rights. The decision's ambiguity will only serve to complicate
the tasks of those responsible for implementing search and seizure
procedures. It is important, therefore, that in future criminal proce59. Brief for Respondent at i, 2-3.
60. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 210 (1961).
61. 265 N.W.2d at 839; see United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1201 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 834 (1970); State v. Stephenson, 310 Minn. 229, 233,245 N.W.2d
621, 624 (1976).
62. State courts have occasionally been characterized as insensitive to federal
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 520-21, 525, 530-33 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But see id. at 493 n.35 (majority opinion). But, in recent
years, some state courts have demonstrated a willingness to give greater protection to
federal rights than have federal courts. See Johnson v. Kelly, 583 F.2d 1242, 1258 &
n.9 (3d Cir. 1978) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (quoting Zeigler, ConstitutionalRights of
the Accused-Developing Dichotomy Between Federaland State Law, 48 PA. B.A.Q.
241, 249 (1977)); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764-65, 557 P.2d 929, 950-51, 135
Cal. Rptr. 345, 366-67 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977). Lien presented an
opportunity for the Minnesota Supreme Court to give greater protection to individual
fourth amendment rights than would a federal court. Although the court concluded
that the intrusion in Lien did not reach federal constitutional dimensions, it could have
based exclusion of the evidence on MIN. CONST. art. I, § 10 (prohibiting unreasonable
searches and seizures), or on MiNN. STAT. § 626.21(7) (1978) (discussed at note 2 supra).
Had such a decision been grounded on a state law, there would be no federal grounds
for overturning it. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 764-65, 557 P.2d 929,
950-51, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 366-67 (1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977).
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dure cases, the court remove this ambiguity by deciding cases in a
manner consistent with the principles it has established to protect
criminal defendants.

